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Abstract
This paper examines the processes of formulation of UN Sustainable Development Goal 12 (SDG 12) – ‘Ensure Sustainable
Consumption and Production Patterns’ – and its targets and indicators. We argue that business interests have steered its nar-
rative of sustainable growth. The outcome of the SDG 12 negotiations reﬂects a production- and design-centered perspective
that emerged in the 1990s and has a business-friendly regulatory approach and faith in solutions through new technologies.
We show how the targets and indicators emerged in debates between national governments, UN agencies, civil society and
private sector organizations – and how they reﬂect both the political process and technical and practical considerations in
translation of a broad concept into the SDG format. While the emergence of SDG 12 as a standalone goal stems from a push
by developing countries to build pressure on developed countries, and its presence may open space for attention to this area
in the future, many of its targets were watered down and left vague. The indicators to measure progress on the targets fur-
ther narrow the scope and ambition of Goal 12, whose current content does not adequately reﬂect earlier more transforma-
tive conceptualizations of Sustainable Consumption and Production.
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are envi-
sioned as universal goals, relevant for both developed and
developing countries.1 They link economic, social and envi-
ronmental dimensions of development (UN, 2015), moving
beyond the narrower focus on poverty and human develop-
ment which characterized the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) (Fukuda-Parr, 2016), and merging it with the
environment agenda pursued through the UN Conferences
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) since the early 1990s.
The combined agenda now includes a focus on achieving
sustainable consumption and production (SCP) patterns,
which despite substantial discussion through the UNCSD
process had not become part of conventional development
approaches.
Our paper analyzes how the concept of SCP was incorpo-
rated as standalone goal SDG 12, ‘Ensure Sustainable Con-
sumption and Production Patterns’, and elaborated as a set
of sub-goals (known as ‘targets’ despite often lacking speci-
ﬁcity) and corresponding indicators. First, we evaluate how
SCP is conceptualized and operationalized in SDG 12, and
how this relates to the history of the concept and discourse,
by comparing assumptions underlying the goal and its tar-
gets with the predominant understandings of SCP. Second,
we study the SCP-related discussions in the Open Working
Group (OWG) of the UN General Assembly, to understand
the determination of the ﬁnal text on SDG 12 targets.2 Third,
we similarly explore the subsequent work of the Inter-
agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG). For the
third and fourth sections we studied the deliberations of the
OWG and IAEG as made available publicly by the UN and
supplemented this with reference to secondary sources,
including discussions of these and related processes
published by insiders.3 To conclude we review how both
technical and political factors brought watered down SDG
12 targets and how the selected indicators are often prod-
ucts of compromise and expediency which need to be revis-
ited and deepened. The paper does not assess how far the
concept of SCP has been adopted in other SDGs, which
would require a separate exercise.
The pedigree of ‘Sustainable Consumption and
Production’ Ideas and their influence on SDG 12
The evolving conceptualization of sustainable
consumption and production
Discourses on SCP have featured in UN discussions on the
environment and sustainable development since the 1972
UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.
Earlier work had introduced closed-systems perspectives,
including the ‘spaceship earth’ concept (Fuller, 1968; Ward,
1966) that the earth’s resources are ﬁnite and its capacity to
re-absorb the by-products of production processes is also
limited. Also in 1972, the Club of Rome, a network of senior
scientists and industrialists, released a report commissioned
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Using com-
puter simulations, Limits to Growth updated the Malthusian
vision of contradiction between static stocks of resources
and arithmetic growth in some means of production versus
geometric growth in population and consumption, to cau-
tion against continuing the extant economic trajectories
(Meadows et al., 1972). Much subsequent work has empha-
sized that several key limits concern not the earth’s stocks
but its ability to act as a sink for pollution. Both types of
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limits ﬁgure in current understandings of planetary bound-
aries (e.g., Carpenter and Bennett, 2011; Steffen et al., 2015).
These discussions tried to respond to ever-increasing con-
sumption and inefﬁcient production by calling upon both
morality and human ingenuity to safeguard ecosystems for
future generations as well as safeguard contemporary vul-
nerable groups. Arguments for consumption restraint and
an eventual steady-state economy (e.g. Daly, 1973) failed to
become mainstream. Absolute and relative poverty for some
people in all countries, and the inbuilt expansion impera-
tives in capitalist systems, limited serious discussion about
shifting from economic growth. Nevertheless, the discus-
sions began to call into question unsustainable rates of
resource extraction and pollution.
This phase culminated in the Brundtland Commission (the
United Nations World Commission on Environment and
Development) report Our Common Future in 1987, which
introduced the term ‘sustainable development’. It called for
not compromising the ability of future generations to fulﬁl
their needs, and implied a difference between felt wants
and justiﬁed needs. While it emphasized that growth was
necessary to reduce global poverty, it highlighted also the
imbalance between consumption patterns of the wealthy
and the poor, opening space for discussions about con-
sumption levels. Arguing that ‘perceived needs are socially
and culturally determined’, the report argued that sustain-
able development required, ﬁrst, ‘promotion of values that
encourage consumption standards that are within the
bounds of the ecologically possible and to which all can rea-
sonably aspire’ and, second, ‘a production system that
respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base for
development’ (WCED, 1987, pp. 42, 58).
The term sustainable development and the concept of
SCP became progressively popularized and elaborated,
including in successive UN Conferences on Sustainable
Development. The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development at the 1992 Earth Summit (the UN Conference
on Environment and Development) called on states to ‘re-
duce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production
and consumption’ (UN, 1992). The 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg recognized that
‘fundamental changes in the way societies produce and
consume are indispensable for achieving global sustainable
development’ and called for ‘a 10-year framework of pro-
grammes in support of regional and national initiatives to
accelerate the shift towards sustainable consumption and
production’ (UN, 2002). The Brundtland focus on consump-
tion norms, ‘standards’ and levels was gradually displaced
by focus on methods of production and consumption.4 The
follow-up Marrakech Process, launched in 2003, further
mainstreamed such ideas of SCP and culminated in the
adoption of a broad-brush and indicative 10-year Framework
of Programmes on SCP Patterns (10YFP) at the 2012 UN
Conference on Sustainable Development, the Rio+20 Confer-
ence. Its outcome document stated that ‘poverty eradica-
tion, changing unsustainable and promoting sustainable
patterns of consumption and production and protecting and
managing the natural resource base of economic and social
development are the overarching objectives of and essential
requirements for sustainable development’ (UN, 2012a).
Corporate and industrial interests have played a major
role in formulation of sustainable development concepts
and strategies ever since the initial stages, including in inﬂu-
encing understandings of SCP in UN discourse. Strong regu-
latory laws had been enacted in various developed
countries, for example the Clean Air (1963, 1970) and Clean
Water (1972) Acts in the United States. The prospect of fur-
ther and stronger regulation motivated business to propa-
gate ideas of self-regulation and market-based innovation as
counterweights. From the other side, important organiza-
tions working on sustainable development sought corporate
involvement because they realized that production and con-
sumption occur largely in a context of private transactions
where regulatory approaches are often slow, belated, and
politically difﬁcult. The World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development emerged after the Secretary General of
the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, Canadian businessman Mau-
rice Strong, appointed Swiss industrialist Stephan Schmid-
heiny as his chief advisor for business and industry.
Similarly, the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), which
was established by the Swedish government in 1989 and
has become one of the most prominent policy-oriented
organizations in the sustainable development ﬁeld, had from
the start a strong orientation to private business. Opening a
major SEI volume on Clean Production Strategies, the SEI
vice-director warned against treating industry as the enemy,
to be curbed: ‘SEI has always striven to avoid this’. Industry,
like future generations, has needs, so SEI ‘has made a con-
scious effort to seek out solutions to environmental prob-
lems which take account of the demands and the needs of
industry . . . and to embrace rather than alienate the senti-
ments of the industrial lobby’; by ‘redesigning products and
processes, reexamining economic activity and reorienting
consumption patterns . . . and the devising of policies and
institutional frameworks which allow for the natural tenden-
cies of commercial enterprise for innovation’ (Kristoferson,
1993). For the industrial lobby the phrase ‘sustainable con-
sumption and production patterns’ already from the 1990s
meant re-engineered consumption, not reduced or con-
strained consumption. With sufﬁcient ‘natural’ innovation
then consumption can cease to impose environmental bur-
dens and can expand without limit.
One result of the intersection between business and the
UN in the formulation of sustainable development strategies
has thus been a shift of emphasis away from consumption
volume, a focus in Daly, to cleaner production. The theme
of ever greater technological innovation permeates the cor-
porate-centered literature. Schmidheiny (1992) himself pub-
lished Changing Course, in which corporations were
encouraged to look upon sustainability as a business oppor-
tunity, not as an existential threat. The book highlighted cor-
porate best practices, to present sustainable development
not as a choice between environmental protection and eco-
nomic growth but as reconciliation of the two. This and
other works emphatically opposed strong governmental reg-
ulation, in favour of allowing market forces to develop,
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deliver, and deploy the innovations necessary for sustainable
development. Many environmentalists too campaigned to
revolutionize technical efﬁciency levels; for example, com-
missioned by the Club of Rome, Weizs€acker, Lovins, and
Lovins (1997)’s Factor Four proposed that by adopting the
best practices available the global economy could create
‘four times as much wealth’ without increasing resource
usage.
While this literature was antipathetic to government reg-
ulation, it recognized that some essential changes in cor-
porate beliefs and purpose would require corresponding
supportive policy plus regulatory innovation; for example,
the ‘polluter pays principle’, so that corporations come to
internalize the idea that ‘pollution prevention pays’.5 It
called similarly for the removal of subsidies which encour-
age unsustainable practices, and emphasized a lifecycle
approach to product management wherein a ﬁrm’s
responsibility would extend to the eventual disposal or
recycling of its product and where the polluting outputs
of one set of industrial processes could be channeled as
feeds into others (Hawken, 1994). In parallel, for retail and
trading concerns the idea of product stewardship was pro-
posed (Schmidheiny, 1992). The assertion was that the
natural bases for human survival could be protected with-
out abandoning endlessly increasing wealth creation and
consumption.
When one compares these works with the ideas on SCP
in subsequent ofﬁcial UN discourse, including in the Mar-
rakech Process and the 10YFP on SCP, one ﬁnds great simi-
larities. The 1987 Brundtland Commission report addressed
not only moderating the environmental impacts of eco-
nomic growth, but the need to fundamentally change
unsustainable consumption patterns, plus the inter and
intragenerational equity issues associated with growth (Hol-
den et al., 2014; Langhelle, 1999; WCED, 1987). In contrast,
current mainstream understandings of SCP center on ‘doing
more and better with less’ and thereby ‘increasing net wel-
fare gains from economic activities by reducing resource
use, degradation and pollution along the whole lifecycle,
while increasing quality of life’ (UNEP, 2010, p. 13). SCP ‘is
not about consuming less but consuming differently’,
declared the long-term head of the SCP department in the
coordinating agency, UNEP (Hoballah, 2016, p. 3).6 Inte-
grated product lifecycles approaches to SCP look at produc-
tion, consumption, disposal, and recycling processes
together (UNEP and IISD, 2014); the separate concern with
the volume of consumption disappears. Protecting the envi-
ronment and aspiring to unendingly higher levels of con-
sumption for everyone are not seen as contradictory. The
now predominant faith is that economic growth can be
decoupled from environmental degradation and resource
depletion. Not regulation but technological innovation and
transfer, via partnerships between governments, private sec-
tor and civil society, are emphasized (UNEP, 2010). With
appropriate policies and incentive structures, sustainable
patterns of production and consumption can, it is argued,
avoid reducing growth and compromising on economic and
social demands, and instead permit increased prosperity
through creation of new markets, decent jobs, and opportu-
nities for developing countries to leapfrog to better tech-
nologies (UNEP, 2010).
This shared set of ideas reﬂects the close involvement of
business groups both in the general SCP discourse since the
1990s and in the UN-led processes through which SCP has
been incorporated into the global sustainable development
agenda. The central role-played by UNEP in these initiatives
also explains the consistent manner in which the SCP con-
cept has been presented in ofﬁcial UN discourse. The lan-
guage used on SCP across key strategy documents –
including the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (UN,
2002), the Marrakech Process progress report (UNEP, 2011)
and the text of the 10YFP (UN, 2012b) – has remained
remarkably constant.
The specification of sustainable consumption and
production in SDG 12
The standalone Goal 12 is to ‘Ensure sustainable consump-
tion and production patterns’. It includes eight speciﬁc tar-
gets (Targets 12.1–12.8) plus three targets related to Means
of Implementation (12.a–12.c) (refer to Table 1). They view
sustainability mainly through the lens of production efﬁ-
ciency, in relation to use of natural resources (12.2), food
production and supply related losses (12.3), management of
chemicals and wastes (12.4), sustainable corporate practices
and reporting (12.6) and sustainable public procurement
(12.7). With the exception of targets to reduce food waste at
the consumer level (12.3) and promote (voluntary) consumer
action by ensuring universal access to information for sus-
tainable lifestyles (12.8), the Goal does not highlight unsus-
tainable patterns of consumption. This reﬂects the stance in
the 2030 Agenda as a whole: its Paragraph 9 declares: ‘We
envisage a world in which every country enjoys sustained,
inclusive, and sustainable economic growth.’ (UN, 2015;
emphasis added). Monitoring sustainable tourism (12.b) has
no deﬁnite action content at all in regard to tourism levels.
The targets for reduced waste generation (12.5) and
rationalizing fossil fuel subsidies (12.c) can cover both pro-
duction and consumption, but especially the former can in
practice emphasize new business opportunities rather than
change of consumer lifestyles.
The language in the targets emphasizes voluntary and
indirect policy approaches for achieving SCP patterns: to
‘encourage sustainable corporate practices and reporting’
(Target 12.6), ‘promote’ sustainable public procurement (Tar-
get 12.7), or provide people with ‘relevant information and
awareness’ (Target 12.8). The 10YFP on SCP, whose imple-
mentation is the focus of Target 12.1, is a purely voluntary
initiative.7 With the possible exception of measures to ‘ra-
tionalize’ inefﬁcient fossil fuel subsidies (Target 12.c), there is
no explicit acknowledgement of the need for regulatory
changes to enforce sustainable practices and to restrict or
prohibit unsustainable ones. Akenji and Bengtsson (2014)
note that neither the 10YFP nor SDG 12 give attention to
key drivers of unsustainability, such as the business strategy
of built-in obsolescence.
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Many of the targets call for substantial improvements with-
out making speciﬁc quantiﬁed commitments. Rather, they
seek broadly deﬁned outcomes: to ‘achieve’ the sustainable
management and efﬁcient use of natural resources (Target
12.2) and environmentally sound management of chemicals
and all wastes (12.4), ‘ensure’ universal access to relevant
information and awareness for sustainable development and
lifestyles (12.8), or ‘reduce’ food losses (12.3), chemical and
waste pollution (12.4) and waste generation (12.5). Target
12.3 to halve per capita global food waste at the retail and
consumer levels by 2030 is an outlier in this regard.
Underlying SDG 12 is a faith in human ability to manage
the adverse environmental impacts of unending economic
growth, including in already rich countries, through techno-
logical innovation and cooperation (see, e.g., Targets 12.1 and
12.a), efﬁcient resource use (Target 12.2) and cleaner produc-
tion processes (Targets 12.3, 12.4, 12.5 and 12.c). Many of the
targets incorporate ideas from the 1990s discussions around
product design (12.5), lifecycle approaches (12.3, 12.4 and
12.5) and sustainable corporations (12.6 and 12.7).
In sum, the text of SDG 12 and its targets adheres closely
to ideas developed and popularized by business-oriented
Table 1. SDG 12 targets and indicators
SDG 12 Target Indicator
12.1 Implement the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on
Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, all countries
taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking
into account the development and capabilities of developing
countries
12.1.1 Number of countries with sustainable consumption and
production (SCP) national action plans or SCP mainstreamed as a
priority or a target into national policies
12.2 By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efﬁcient
use of natural resources
12.2.1 Material footprint, material footprint per capita, and material
footprint per GDP
12.2.2 Domestic material consumption, domestic material
consumption per capita, and domestic material consumption per
GDP
12.3 By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and
consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and
supply chains, including post-harvest losses
12.3.1 Global Food Loss Index (GFLI)
12.4 By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of
chemicals and all wastes throughout their lifecycle, in accordance
with agreed international frameworks, and signiﬁcantly reduce
their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their
adverse impacts on human health and the environment
12.4.1 Number of parties to international multilateral environmental
agreements on hazardous waste, and other chemicals that meet
their commitments and obligations in transmitting information as
required by each relevant agreement
12.4.2 Hazardous waste generated per capita and proportion of
hazardous waste treated, by type of treatment
12.5 By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through
prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse
12.5.1 National recycling rate, tons of material recycled
12.6 Encourage companies, especially large and transnational
companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate
sustainability information into their reporting cycle
12.6.1 Number of companies publishing sustainability reports
12.7 Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in
accordance with national policies and priorities
12.7.1 Number of countries implementing sustainable public
procurement policies and action plans
12.8 By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant
information and awareness for sustainable development and
lifestyles in harmony with nature
12.8.1 Extent to which: (i) global citizenship education and (ii)
education for sustainable development (including climate change
education) are mainstreamed in: (a) national education policies;
(b) curricula; (c) teacher education; and (d) student assessment
12.a Support developing countries to strengthen their scientiﬁc
and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable
patterns of consumption and production
12.a.1 Amount of support to developing countries on research and
development for sustainable consumption and production and
environmentally sound technologies
12.b Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable
development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs
and promotes local culture and products
12.b.1 Number of sustainable tourism strategies or policies and
implemented action plans with agreed monitoring and evaluation
tools
12.c Rationalize inefﬁcient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage
wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in
accordance with national circumstances, including by
restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies,
where they exist, to reﬂect their environmental impacts, taking
fully into account the speciﬁc needs and conditions of
developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse
impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor
and the affected communities
12.c.1 Amount of fossil-fuel subsidies per unit of GDP (production
and consumption) and as a proportion of total national
expenditure on fossil fuels
(Source: UN, 2015)
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norm entrepreneurs since the 1990s, whose main audiences
were, ﬁrst, government ofﬁcials to whom the message was
to downplay regulation as a tool for promoting sustainability
and, second, corporate leaders for whom the message was
that sustainability should be embraced as a proﬁtable way
of thinking about their businesses.
The formulation of Sustainable Development Goal
12: The Open Working Group of the General
Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals
The OWG of the General Assembly developed an SDGs pro-
posal through a series of 13 sessions between March 2013
and July 2014, as an intergovernmental forum comprised of
nominated (sets of) member countries representing the ﬁve
UN regional groupings (UN, 2014a). Representatives of the
UN Specialized Agencies, international organizations and
the UN Major Groups8 and NGOs in consultative status with
the UN Economic and Social Council participated as obser-
vers, often contributing detailed representations and pro-
posals. The OWG sought to reconcile the wide range of
views and build consensus among members on a concrete
proposal for goals and targets. Its recommendations on SDG
12 were fully adopted in the subsequent intergovernmental
negotiations in New York and endorsed in the following
Summit, reﬂecting the uniﬁed insistence by the developing
countries bloc on not reopening discussion on basic issues
(Dodds et al., 2017). The seventh OWG session, covering
‘sustainable consumption and production (including chemi-
cals and waste)’, and negotiations during the ninth to thir-
teenth sessions are particularly relevant for our purposes.
The documents from these sessions – presentations, state-
ments by member states and other actors and session sum-
maries – show the following key SCP-related debates.
SCP as a standalone goal or a crosscutting theme in the
SDGs
While broad consensus existed among OWG members and
observers on the crucial importance of SCP patterns, the
choice between a standalone goal or a crosscutting theme
across different goals was debated at length. The High-level
Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development
Agenda and the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Net-
work had called for SCP to be a crosscutting theme, with a
range of SCP-related targets under different goals. Many
developed countries echoed these arguments in the OWG
sessions.
The joint statements by Canada, Israel and the USA argued
for targets under many different goals, given the complex
and overarching character of SCP.9 The troika of Australia, the
Netherlands and the UK argued similarly10; as did Poland and
Romania.11 Though the group of France, Germany and
Switzerland did not explicitly oppose a standalone goal, their
representations focused on integrating SCP in the develop-
ment agenda within a proposed goal on ‘sustainable and
inclusive growth’ and in areas like energy, health, food secu-
rity, water and sanitation, climate change and education.12
Several other developed countries – including Greece, Swe-
den, Bulgaria and Croatia, and the troika of Denmark, Ireland
and Norway – followed a similar approach. Among developed
countries, the representation by Italy, Turkey and Spain was
one of few calling for a separate goal, both to raise SCP’s visi-
bility and better capture its breadth, as certain aspects would
not ﬁt under other goals.13 Finland argued that given the
ambitious nature of the SCP theme and its linkages to all
three sustainability dimensions, it should be both a stan-
dalone goal and incorporated in other goals.14
Many developing countries pushed emphatically for a
standalone goal, as in statements by Indonesia, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Brazil and Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Singapore
and the UAE, and regional groupings like the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM), Economic Community of West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African countries.
Several representations highlighted the need to also main-
stream SCP in other goals. The troika of India, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka, plus India in separate statements, argued like Fin-
land: SCP patterns were crucial, so the objective should be
both a separate goal and mainstreamed in the SDGs.15
There remained no overall consensus among developing
countries, so the main G77-and-China group never lent
explicit support for a standalone goal.16 But, suggest Dodds
et al. (2017, p. 34), for a large set of countries ‘the goal on
sustainable consumption and production became an impor-
tant test of commitment to a universal agenda’ and a way
to underline responsibilities for rich countries too.17
Among the OWG observers, the UN Inter-Agency Techni-
cal Support Team of specialized UN agencies argued for a
crosscutting approach. It proposed ‘integrated’ goals con-
taining targets that seek to decouple economic develop-
ment from natural resource depletion and environmental
degradation (UN, 2014b, p. 8). Similarly, a detailed proposal
by the BioRegional Development Group18 on behalf of the
Beyond 2015 coalition – a global civil society campaign –
suggested that the SCP theme might need not a standalone
goal but integration into other goals (BioRegional, 2013). On
the other hand, the joint statement by European NGOs
argued for a standalone goal, that would help implementa-
tion of the 10YFP on SCP.19
A widely read paper by Akenji and Bengtsson (2014) sug-
gested that a crosscutting approach helps to address the
interlinkages between sustainable development challenges
and ensure that SCP is adequately embedded; whereas a
standalone goal facilitates integration of economic, social,
and environmental dimensions and provides greater visibil-
ity and political attention. In the end, both paths were
adopted. The choice for a standalone SCP goal, in the OWG
proposal and the ﬁnal SDG Declaration, matched the
demand by many developing countries to highlight tasks
where developed countries must take a lead. At the same
time, targets with direct relevance to SCP were included
under many other goals. UNEP and IISD (2015) identify 13
SCP-related targets under 12 goals besides SDG 12. Many of
these address issues also tackled by SDG 12, including
resource use and efﬁciency, education for sustainable devel-
opment, chemical and waste pollution, and sustainable
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tourism. The outcome likely represents an attempt to bal-
ance the contrasting positions and an acknowledgement of
SCP’s broad nature. Akenji and Bengtsson (2014) warn it
could also become a source of confusion.
Respective responsibilities of developed and developing
countries
The OWG discussions revealed a divide between developed
and developing countries over which countries should bear
primary responsibility for efforts to achieve SCP. In 2011, the
UN Commission on Sustainable Development had failed to
agree any outcome document on SCP (Dodds et al., 2017).
Now, in the OWG, developing countries consistently reiter-
ated that the Rio principles, in particular the principle of
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), should
be recognized as guiding the SDGs.20 The G77-and-China
group as well as the individual representations by most
developing countries further argued that imbalances and
inequities in global consumption patterns and lifestyles
required that developed countries must lead on SCP, with
developing countries following but without compromising
their priorities of poverty eradication and socioeconomic pro-
gress.21 For instance, the presentation by India, Pakistan, and
Sri Lanka stated: ‘just like poverty eradication and hunger are
to be tackled primarily in developing countries, similarly the
battle against unsustainable patterns of consumption will be
won or lost in the developed countries.’22 Brazil and Nicara-
gua called for ‘addressing consumerist lifestyles and the cul-
ture of “overconsumption” created and largely fostered by
developed countries’.23 In addition, developing countries
emphasized ensuring adequate Means Of Implementation,
particularly ﬁnancial resources and technology transfer from
developed countries.24
A number of developed countries – including Japan, Por-
tugal, Poland and Romania, and the troika of Australia, the
Netherlands and the UK – claimed that CBDR applied only
to multilateral environmental agreements, not to the SDGs.25
Most developed countries’ statements on SCP did not
explicitly mention CBDR, but emphasized the universal rele-
vance and nature of the challenge of achieving SCP pat-
terns, while acknowledging differences in the needs and
capabilities of different countries.26 Many of these state-
ments stressed the beneﬁts developing countries could
derive from taking action, in terms of cleaner growth, green
jobs, and transition to more sustainable practices and tech-
nologies. Statements by Sweden, Finland and the troika of
France, Germany and Switzerland did acknowledge the need
for developed countries to take the lead.
Differences over developed and developing country
responsibility were also apparent in proposals for speciﬁc
targets. Representations by China, Indonesia and Kazakhstan,
India, Brazil and Nicaragua, and the troika of Argentina, Boli-
via and Ecuador all argued for explicit language establishing
the primary responsibility of developed countries in imple-
menting targets in areas like sustainable lifestyles, economic
incentives for SCP patterns, corporate sustainability, waste
management, and natural resource efﬁciency.27 They argued
that speciﬁc percentage improvement targets be restricted
to developed countries, and for removal or reformulation of
targets using concepts that were not multilaterally deﬁned –
for instance, ‘culture of sufﬁciency’, ‘sustainable lifestyles’
and ‘sustainable supply chains’ – and that could potentially
result in additional obligations or trade restrictions on devel-
oping countries. In contrast, many developed countries’
statements made proposals for additional SCP targets. The
outcomes of the 2013–15 discussions in New York can be
seen as a compromise.28
All the SDG 12 targets are universally applicable, with
some emphasis on special developed country responsibili-
ties for 10YFP implementation and providing scientiﬁc and
technological support to developing countries. However, the
targets are vague and diluted. Almost all percentage refer-
ences in targets were removed, so countries have not com-
mitted to clear quantiﬁed improvements. For instance,
target 12.5 aims to ‘substantially reduce’ waste generation,
unlike previous proposals for a speciﬁc percentage reduction
in overall and/or per capita waste. Similarly, calls for a speci-
ﬁc percentage increase in corporate sustainability reporting
were reduced to just an ‘increase’ in this practice; and the
ﬁnal target 12.6 only aims to ‘encourage’ sustainability
reporting by companies. Most terms and concepts opposed
by developing countries have also been removed from the
targets, leaving their intent and scope in many cases
unclear. In other cases too, the ambition of targets appears
diluted. The ﬁnal target 12.3 aims to halve per capita global
food waste at the retail and consumer levels, but excludes
the similar reduction in production-related losses that was
initially proposed. Target 12.7 seeks to ‘promote’ sustainable
public procurement practices, rather than to ‘(substantially)
increase’ the share of such procurement as in earlier propos-
als. An exception to this trend is Target 12.8, which seeks to
‘ensure’ universal access to information and awareness for
sustainable development and lifestyles, rather than merely
‘redouble efforts’ as earlier proposed. A likely consequence
of such changes is that progress by countries on achieving
SCP patterns will depend largely on their speciﬁc interests
and priorities, rather than on effective obligations created
under SDG 12. The implied theory of change is that the glo-
bal framework will channel attention and stimulate country-
speciﬁc commitments that vary according to local opportu-
nities and dynamics.
The central position of the 10-Year Framework of
Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production
Patterns
OWG members agreed that the SDGs should be consistent
with existing international laws, frameworks and commit-
ments (UN, 2013). During SCP-related discussions, many
countries therefore stressed the importance of implement-
ing and ensuring resources for the 10-Year Framework of
Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production
Patterns (10YFP) that had slowly emerged via the Marrakech
Process after the 2002 Johannesburg summit, under UNEP
supervision (UN, 2014c). After failure to reach agreement in
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the 2011 meeting of the UN Commission on Sustainable
Development, the 10YFP was adopted at the 2012 Rio Con-
ference. It has been envisioned as a ‘global framework of
action to enhance international cooperation to accelerate
the shift towards sustainable consumption and production
(SCP) in both developed and developing countries’ (UNEP,
undated).
The 10YFP has become target 12.1 under SDG 12, that
calls now for its universal implementation. Its components
of sustainable public procurement, consumer awareness,
sustainable lifestyles, sustainable tourism, and food waste
reduction are also explicitly addressed as other SDG 12 tar-
gets. More broadly, implementation of the 10YFP can con-
tribute to the achievement of most SDG 12 targets,
particularly those relating to use of natural resources, waste
generation, sustainable corporate practices and reporting,
and scientiﬁc and technological support to developing
countries.29
The other SDG 12 targets do not go fundamentally
beyond the 10YFP, retaining its emphasis on voluntary, mul-
ti-stakeholder cooperation in relevant areas and on green
economy style ideas. For example, target 12.6 merely
‘Encourage[s] companies . . . to adopt sustainable practices.’
It reduces even the much narrower theme of corporate sus-
tainability reporting to mere ‘encouragement’, diluting lan-
guage proposed in initial OWG discussions, in response to
developing countries’ demands for consistency with the
Rio+20 outcome document.30 Leading developed countries
had in turn resisted inclusion of signiﬁcant provisions on
corporate environmental responsibility and on addition of
sustainability criteria into the work of ﬁnance agencies dur-
ing the Rio+20 negotiations (Dodds et al., 2014); the US
government blocked a proposal for obligatory environmen-
tal reporting by companies (Dodds et al., 2014). In contrast
to resistance in these areas, ‘right from the ﬁrst informal
consultation [for Rio+20] the link between sustainable con-
sumption and production and the green economy [had]
emerged as an area where most progress could be made’
(Dodds et al., 2014, p. 159); SDG 12 reﬂects this.
Ensuring conformity with existing international agree-
ments has inﬂuenced the scope and language of other SDG
12 targets too. For instance, target 12.4 on chemicals and
hazardous waste management is focused on commitments
made under relevant international conventions (speciﬁcally,
the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions). The text
of this target, including the call for its achievement by 2020,
is in line with the Strategic Approach to International Chem-
icals Management (SAICM) and the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation (UN, 2002).
The SDG 12 targets largely represent what major corpora-
tions and patron governments have already proposed or
accepted in other fora, rather than major new commitments.
SDG 12 does add an extra degree of attention and encour-
agement to these existing commitments, while remaining at
the level of encouragement: ‘We encourage the implemen-
tation of the 10-Year Framework of Programmes’ (UN, 2015,
para. 28). Targets are global – for all countries – but ‘aspira-
tional’ (UN, 2015, para. 55), wishes.
Formulating indicators for Sustainable
Development Goal 12
The ﬁnalization of SDGs and corresponding targets has been
followed by a process of developing indicators at the global
level to monitor progress. Formulation of this Global
Indicator Framework (UN, 2017a) was led by the intergov-
ernmental Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG indicators
(IAEG-SDGs), created by the UN Statistical Commission in
March 2015. For SDG 12, a total of 13 indicators had been
identiﬁed (see Table 1), as of end-2017. Many match those
in the monitoring and evaluation framework developed for
the 10YFP (UNEP, 2016). Nearly all these global SDG 12 indi-
cators are, however, not yet well-developed and operational-
ized. At the time of their inclusion in the Global Indicator
Framework, 11 out of 13 were classiﬁed as Tier III: an inter-
nationally agreed methodology for their measurement did
not exist. Indicator 12.2.2 on domestic material consumption
was classiﬁed as Tier II (established methodology exists but
data is not easily available), while only indicator 12.4.1 on
reporting under multilateral environmental agreements on
hazardous waste and chemicals was Tier I (both an estab-
lished methodology and data exist) (UN, 2016b). As of May
2018, ten SDG 12 indicators continued to be classiﬁed as
Tier III, alongside one in Tier II, and two in Tier I (UN, 2018).
The IAEG-SDGs indicator selection and development
process
The IAEG-SDGs too relied on an intergovernmental process,
here involving 28 National Statistical Ofﬁces (NSOs) from all
the ﬁve UN regional groups. Members developed the Global
Indicator Framework through four meetings between June
2015 and November 2016. Open consultations were also
conducted with observers (countries which were not IAEG-
SDGs members, UN Regional Commissions, and various
regional and international organizations), and the UN Major
Groups and other civil society actors.31 Most SDG 12 indica-
tors were discussed and ﬁnalized already during the ﬁrst
two IAEG-SDGs meetings – in New York in June 2015 and
Bangkok in October 2015 – and the associated consulta-
tions.
The specialized UN agencies – in particular, UNEP (as
coordinating agency for SDG 12), the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) and the UN World Tourism Organization
(UNWTO) – were closely involved in SDG 12 indicator selec-
tion. They provided an initial compilation of proposed indi-
cators for discussion by IAEG-SDGs members and later
suggested revisions to the expert group’s proposals (UN,
2016a). UNEP is also centrally involved in the ongoing
methodological development of SDG 12 indicators currently
classiﬁed as Tier II and III. Other UN agencies coordinate par-
ticular parts of this work, such as the FAO (indicator 12.3.1),
the UN Statistics Division (indicators 12.4.2 and 12.5.1), and
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (indicator
12.6.1). They consult other bodies with speciﬁc expertise.
For instance, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Sustain-
able Stock Exchanges Initiative and member governments of
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the Group of Friends of Paragraph 47 (GoF47) have partici-
pated in the discussions on indicator 12.6.1 on company
sustainability reporting (UN, 2017b).
Since the Global Indicator Framework is very recent, we
concentrate on the preparation debates and outcome. This
is supplemented by an examination of the current process
and work plans for further development of Tier II and III
indicators. It is too early to identify impacts, let alone from
the major complementary work expected at country level.
Even for the Netherlands, that sees itself as a leader in sus-
tainability research and awareness, its 2017 Voluntary
National Review on measuring national performance in
regard to the SDGs showed large gaps in data coverage for
SDG 12, even after sometimes turning to substitute indica-
tors, and great shortcomings in performance in areas where
data exists.32
Analyzing SDG 12 Indicators – mismatches between
targets and indicators
The SDG 12 indicators show major deﬁciencies, in particular
inadequate coverage of corresponding targets and a check-
list orientation which privileges counting of reports over
examination of their content and quality. Speciﬁcally:
• Target 12.3: the Global Food Loss Indicator (Indicator
12.3.1) is a measure of production-related food losses. In
the IAEG-SDGs discussions, some countries commented
on its lack of clarity in deﬁnition and coverage, and on
problems of data availability and reliability.33 However, it
was ultimately adopted in its original form. It does not
cover the other component of Target 12.3, to halve per
capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels
by 2030. An additional indicator on Per Capita Food
Waste, suggested by UNEP and the World Resources Insti-
tute, was not accepted, in part due to concerns about
data quality and availability.34 Further methodological
development of the Global Food Loss Indicator by the
FAO does not include plans for an additional indicator or
for methodology to measure food waste (UN, 2017b).
• Target 12.4: the initial proposal for indicator 12.4.1 on
management of chemicals and hazardous wastes was
restricted to hazardous chemicals and to reporting on,
rather than compliance with, relevant international agree-
ments. This became modiﬁed through the IAEG-SDGs dis-
cussions, to cover all chemicals and to count the number
of parties meeting their commitments and obligations for
transmitting information under these agreements. Con-
cerns about limiting coverage to the small proportion of
chemicals covered by existing agreements and the UN
member states that are parties to them remain unad-
dressed.35 The ﬁnal indicator 12.4.1 falls short too in
terms of target 12.4’s call for signiﬁcant reduction in haz-
ardous chemical and waste pollution. In response, the
IAEG-SDGs adopted an additional indicator 12.4.2, on the
generation and treatment of hazardous waste.36
• Target 12.5, to substantially reduce waste generation, is
monitored only through the national recycling rate and tons
of material recycled (Indicator 12.5.1). Since data on total
waste recycled are currently unavailable, the amount and
rate of municipal waste recycled are likely to be used as a
proxy (UN, 2017b). This indicator too remained unchanged
through the IAEG-SDGs discussions, despite concerns that it
did not match the target’s emphasis on prevention and
reduction of waste, and despite suggestions for an addi-
tional or alternative indicator on waste generation.37
• Target 12.c: indicator 12.c.1 estimates the amount of fossil
fuel subsidies as a share of GDP and total national expen-
diture on fossil fuels, but does not focus on subsidies that
are ‘inefﬁcient’ and ‘encourage wasteful consumption’ as
mentioned in the target. Questions about how subsidies
will be deﬁned and measured were raised by various
members and observers.38 The indicator approved by the
IAEG-SDGs is unchanged from the original proposal and
remains loosely deﬁned, likely due to the practical difﬁ-
culties in developing a widely accepted methodology and
the political sensitivities in relation to fossil fuel subsidies.
• Targets 12.1 and 12.7: indicators for targets related to imple-
mentation of the 10YFP (Indicator 12.1.1) and promotion of
sustainable public procurement (Indicator 12.7.1) count the
number of countries with relevant policies and action plans,
but do not evaluate actual progress made in these areas, as
required by the corresponding targets.39 That would require
a focus on more qualitative and complex aspects, including
the contents of the documents and actual government
commitments and funding. However, both these indicators
remained essentially unchanged through the IAEG-SDGs dis-
cussions; suggestions for stronger, and more comprehensive
indicators were not accepted. For indicator 12.7.1, a pro-
posal to instead measure the share of sustainable public
procurement in total public procurement was rejected.40 A
proposal to modify indicator 12.1.1 to directly measure
national progress on implementation of SCP action plans
was similarly not accepted.41
• Target 12.4: for the target on management of chemicals
and hazardous waste, the indicator about transmission of
information required under relevant international agree-
ments (Indicator 12.4.1) does not cover the extent of
compliance or the quality of the information provided.42
• Target 12.6: the indicator to monitor progress in adoption
of sustainable corporate practices and reporting (Indicator
12.6.1) is the number of companies publishing sustain-
ability reports. It says nothing about the quality and accu-
racy of these reports or, as envisioned in the
corresponding target, whether companies are adopting
sustainable business practices.43 Suggestions for an indi-
cator which calculates the share of (large) companies that
publish sustainability reports were rejected.44 Apart from
a clariﬁcation of the focus of the indicator, as about sus-
tainability reports rather than sustainability-related report-
ing more generally, it remained unchanged through the
IAEG-SDGs discussions.
The above analysis highlights numerous instances where
IAEG-SDGs members and observers raised concerns about the
SDG 12 indicators proposed by the UN Specialized Agencies.
Yet agreement on the abovementioned indicators – in their
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originally proposed form or with minor changes – was
achieved fairly early in the IAEG-SDGs process. However, a
few indicators saw considerable further debate and/or
became signiﬁcantly modiﬁed.
• Target 12.2: the proposal to use material footprint (MF)
(Indicator 12.2.1) to measure Target 12.2 on sustainable
management and efﬁcient use of natural resources relies
on a methodological framework currently implemented
by NSOs in the EU and Japan. Its use was challenged by
some IAEG-SDGs members, including due to lack of infor-
mation about the indicator, particularly in developing
countries.45 Suggestions included using an indicator
linked to targets under existing international agreements
on biodiversity conservation,46 and indicators monitoring
speciﬁc natural resources like ﬁsh stocks, timber, and
water.47 While these suggestions were not accepted, the
ﬁnal list of SDG 12 indicators includes an additional indi-
cator, 12.2.2 on Domestic Material Consumption.48 Taken
together, this pair of indicators can help to distinguish
between natural resources pressures due to domestic
consumption and to the extraction of resources for
export to other countries.
• Target 12.8: indicator 12.8.1 for the target on information
and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles
underwent substantial change. Countries argued that the
initial proposal merely counted the number of countries
reporting inclusion of relevant topics in their formal educa-
tion curricula.49 A revised indicator sought to measure the
percentage of educational institutions with formal and
informal curricula on sustainable development and life-
styles. A suggestion to utilize reporting mechanisms under
existing multilateral frameworks for promoting education
on environmental awareness was not adopted50, but indi-
cator 4.7.1 under the Education goal was adopted
instead.51 This is broader in scope, covering mainstream-
ing of global citizenship education and education for sus-
tainable development in national education policies,
curricula, teacher education, and student assessment.
• Targets 12a, 12b: proposals for indicators 12.a.1 and 12.b.1
to measure progress on the means of implementation
faced substantial concerns regarding unclear deﬁnitions,
calculation methodologies, and data availability.52 Many
countries called for indicator 12.a.1 on green patent appli-
cations to be replaced since it did not measure scientiﬁc
and technological support to developing countries, as envi-
sioned in target 12.a.53 The ﬁnal approved indicators are
more closely aligned with the corresponding targets.54
Assessment of the IAEG-SDGs process
The limited scope and ambition of SDG 12 indicators reﬂect,
in part, the inevitable challenges – practical and political – in
monitoring the Goal’s broad agenda through a small number
of measurable indicators. Features of the IAEG-SDGs selection
process seem to have played a role too. The purpose of the
process was to relatively quickly secure acceptance of a list
that was acceptable to all members, to allow the SDGs
exercise to be deemed operative. The relatively short period
of time allotted for securing agreement may have led coun-
tries to limit their opposition, to only the most contentious
cases. Indicators are in principle open to update in 2020 and
2024. Moreover, since the selection of indicators to measure
global progress does not oblige member countries to adopt
only those indicators at the national level, they were more
willing to accept proposals despite their concerns. In addition
to the global monitoring framework, it is expected that mem-
ber states will develop complementary indicators to track pro-
gress at national and regional levels. Further, for SDG 12 in
particular, its sheer breadth and aspirational quality may
explain why there was less protracted disputation at this stage
than for some other goals. Most SDG 12 indicators were
adopted despite signiﬁcant remaining concerns about their
deﬁnitions, calculation methodologies and data availability.
The relatively more political stages of SDG 12 indicator
selection, that involved active NSO participation, have been
followed by a primarily technical process to develop and
reach consensus on Tier II and III indicators, led by the spe-
cialized UN agencies. For many indicators, this concerns
methodological frameworks and datasets that are already
being developed or implemented by various actors – UN
agencies, the 10YFP, private sector organizations and NSOs
of some developed countries. Participation by other NSOs in
this process has been very limited. However, in most
instances, the ﬁnal proposed methodologies have to secure
intergovernmental approval at the UN Statistics Commission.
Work on indicators related to 10YFP implementation (indica-
tor 12.1.1), food losses (indicator 12.3.1), sustainable corporate
practices and reporting (indicator 12.6.1) and sustainable
public procurement (indicator 12.7.1) has been independent
of NSOs. Data for them is being compiled through surveys
commissioned under the auspices of the 10YFP administered
through UNEP or through non-governmental sources (UN,
2017b). In such cases, it remains unclear if and how NSOs will
be involved in data collection, validation and reporting.
Others – like indicator 12.4.2 on hazardous waste generation,
indicator 12.5.1 on waste recycling and indicator 12.8.1 on
access to education on global citizenship and sustainable
development – rely on ofﬁcial data sources, but NSOs have
not so far been directly involved in methodological develop-
ment (UN, 2017b). Work to adapt and build consensus on
indicator 12.2.1 on material footprint and indicator 12c.1 on
fossil fuel subsidies, around the existing methodological
frameworks for these indicators, does involve NSOs (UN,
2017b). Limited NSO participation in development and opera-
tionalization of many SDG 12 indicators would raise ques-
tions about the extent of national ownership of ongoing
monitoring and reporting, which was earlier speciﬁed as a
key objective by the IAEG-SDGs (UN, 2016a).
Review and concluding remarks – promoting
transformative change?
SDG 12 is an extremely broad goal. Both politics and techni-
cal limitations have determined how it has emerged and
been operationalized.
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First, whereas most other SDGs have been achieved to
more or less satisfactory extents in at least some jurisdic-
tions, SCP patterns have not yet been realized anywhere
(see e.g., Akenji and Bengtsson, 2014; Mignaqui, 2014). The
transition path is therefore unclear. Many scholars, for exam-
ple Daly (1973) or Redclift (2002), have argued that pursuit
of such a transformation will require a fundamental rethink
of not just existing production and distribution processes,
but also the culture of ever-growing consumption and the
underlying structures of societal organization and motiva-
tion, including by building an ethical orientation towards
consuming less while ‘living more’ and more equitably.
Recent studies of the material footprint (MF) indicator con-
clude that the developed countries have an MF of around
25 tons per capita while developing countries have an aver-
age of 10–15 tons per capita, with India being one of the
lowest at 3.7 tons per capita (Wiedmann et al., 2015). If, as
one analysis argues, a sustainable level of MF is around
10 tons per capita (Lettenmeier et al., 2014), it appears opti-
mistic to assume that, given that lifting people out of pov-
erty will necessarily increase their consumption levels,
technology and process-based improvements alone can suf-
ﬁce for the transition to sustainability. As the SDG 12 targets
do not deal adequately with the goal’s requirements, espe-
cially with regard to consumption, they fail to engage the
wider public with an urgent agenda for discussion, thereby
increasing the risk that even the necessary technological
and process improvements will be too little and too late.
While fundamentally reorienting consumer societies was a
major theme in various fora that fed into the OWG process,
the targets have rather little to say on it.
Second, we saw that in this respect SDG 12 continues the
intellectual trajectory for SCP which emerged from ‘green
business’ circles in the 1980s and 1990s (a current variant is
‘eco-modernism’: Visscher and Bodelier, 2017): technical inno-
vations will supposedly allow consumption and production to
grow indeﬁnitely. This perspective, articulated in many busi-
ness and business-oriented circles, long ago became the pre-
dominant understanding of SCP in UNEP, the coordinating
agency for SDG 12 discussions, and in for example the post-
2002 Marrakech Process. Major new pro-business lobbying or
interventions in 2012–15 were not required for this perspec-
tive to predominate in the formulation of SDG 12.
Third, what SDG 12 adds are: heightened attention and
universal scope, and incorporation to some degree of the
principle of CBDR. The debate on whether to have a stan-
dalone SCP goal linked closely to that on whether the Rio
principle of CBDR would apply in the SDGs. We saw from the
OWG discussions that the international relations of establish-
ing SDG 12 mirror those in the climate change negotiations:
developed countries espoused a notion of shared responsibil-
ity while many developing countries emphasized differenti-
ated responsibility and the duty and necessity for developed
countries to act ﬁrst and do more. Eventually, the September
2015 UN General Assembly resolution on the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development did include a commitment to
the Rio principles. The push for a standalone goal on SCP,
with developed countries implicitly bearing primary
responsibility for its implementation, represented a partially
successful attempt by developing countries to ensure that
the principle of CBDR was underlined in relation to SCP.
Fourth, this outcome is also a reaction to an internal ten-
sion in the market-induced approach to innovation, in which
innovators are partly motivated by potential monopolistic
rents accruing via intellectual property rights but where this
limits diffusion, especially to developing countries. Concern
about their ability to access green technologies was an
important issue for developing countries during the post-
MDGs negotiations. Many countries, not least India, were
adamant about having SCP as a standalone goal, partly in
order to strengthen the visibility of rich countries’ responsi-
bility to share technology needed for developing countries
to produce cleanly. SDG 12 addresses these concerns in tar-
get 12.a: to ‘support developing countries to strengthen
their scientiﬁc and technological capacities to move towards
more sustainable patterns of consumption and production’.
The target and its indicator talk about ‘support’ in broad
terms, not speciﬁcally technology transfer to developing
countries; but SDG 17 adds targets on technology transfer.
The SDG 12 language is oriented towards heightening atten-
tion rather than setting a directly actionable target, that
anyway would remain largely dependent upon patent-hold-
ing private corporations’ strategic calculations.
Fifth, within this standalone goal, the disagreements and
maneuverings in the OWG discussions reﬂected deeper dis-
agreements about the nature of SCP and the paths to reach
it, including the ethical and production choices to be made
and the distribution of costs and beneﬁts of these efforts.
Thus, for many developed countries, attempts to conceptu-
alize SDG 12 as a ‘developed country’ goal were inconsistent
with the universal nature of the SDG agenda. Given that
there is limited clarity and consensus on how SCP should be
operationalized, the discussions did not lead to an ambitious
set of binding and targeted commitments. The negotiations
brought instead considerable dilution of the scope and
ambition of targets. These remain universal in nature – all
additional references calling on developed countries to ‘take
the lead’ have been removed, with the exception of target
12.1 on implementation of the 10YFP – but they are vague;
and developing relevant indicators to measure and stimu-
late progress will at best be a long-drawn process.
Sixth, the removal of almost all percentage references in
the targets means that countries are not committing to
speciﬁc quantiﬁed improvements. So progress on achieving
SCP patterns depends on the interests and priorities within
individual countries. Instead of calling for strenuous commit-
ments, the approach seems to rely on hopes that harnessing
existing and soon-to-be-developed technologies will obviate
the need for sacriﬁces and politically difﬁcult discussions. It
emphasizes voluntary, informed consumption and produc-
tion decisions, rather than regulation. A sister hope is that
the targets will trigger processes of domestic mobilization
and country-speciﬁc reform. They chart territory for govern-
ment and corporate action, and require corresponding inno-
vation also in indicators, for use in demanding as well as
monitoring progress.
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Seventh, the weakness as yet of most of the globally formu-
lated indicators reﬂects also the problems of operationalizing
vague but ambitious and novel targets, and the limited political
interest in a technical process in which the specialized UN
Agencies and NSOs predominate. Moreover, the process for
deciding upon and specifying the indicators was highly com-
pressed in time. Some existing indicators that are being tested
in other forums, but which only peripherally or partially address
the corresponding SDG 12 targets, have been adopted. Several
of these are proxies. In several areas, such as corporate report-
ing, the indicators are merely publication counts. In addition,
since the NSOs and other responsible parties do not have a
clear and resourced mandate to collect the required data, there
can be little conﬁdence that it will become widely available
soon. Substantive debates and reﬁnement of SDG 12 indicators
might occur in other forums. If so, how far will national govern-
ments feel invested in implementing the monitoring frame-
work, and consequently, how much impact will SDG 12 have in
leading a transition to sustainability?
In sum, given the pressures to reach an agreement
despite strongly conﬂicting interests and technical and prac-
tical challenges, the SDG 12 targets and indicators have
emerged with, as yet, few numbers and too little power to
be truly transformative in regard to global sustainability (cf.
Fukuda-Parr and Yamin, 2015; Merry et al., 2015). On the
positive side, explicit incorporation of SCP in the SDGs rep-
resents a mainstreaming of important initiatives which have
been underway in diverse fora. While most of the targets
under SDG 12 do not yet have satisfactory indicators, enun-
ciation of the targets may spur further work and even some
real actions. The indicator speciﬁcation and target monitor-
ing need ongoing improvement, including at national levels,
where there will sometimes be scope for augmenting the
targets too. At best, SDG 12 might yet evolve to provide a
space for focused public and agency attention, and for
demanding innovation and accountability.
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1. We acknowledge that the terminology of ‘developed’ and ‘develop-
ing’ countries provides a contentious and inadequate description.
Our use of these terms reﬂects their widespread and predominant
use amongst actors involved in preparing the SDGs.
2. The OWG proposal for SDGs and targets was an input to the Inter-
governmental Negotiations of the UN General Assembly to ﬁnalize
a 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We focus more on the
OWG since the later process involved little further discussion on
SCP. For SDG 12, the ﬁnal text adopted by the UN General Assem-
bly is identical to the OWG proposal.
3. The OWG and IAEG documents and proceedings are available
online, through the UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Plat-
form (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html) and
the UN Statistics Division (https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/).
4. The insertion of the words ‘patterns of’, rather than simply talking
of ‘unsustainable production and consumption’, may steer attention
towards the methods rather than levels of production and con-
sumption.
5. The 3M Corporation coined the phrase ‘Pollution Prevention Pays’
in 1975, arguing that avoiding pollution at the outset is more
environmentally effective and economical than ex post pollution
control.
6. Arab Hoballah was head of the SCP division in UNEP from 2005 to
2016.
7. The 10YFP document, adopted at the 2012 Rio+20 conference,
stated that ‘programmes included in the 10-year framework of
programmes on sustainable consumption and production patterns
are voluntary’ (UN, 2012b, p. 8). The conference outcome
document used similar language on their voluntary nature (UN,
2012a).
8. Since their establishment at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the UN
Major groups – including e.g. non-governmental organizations, local
authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientiﬁc
and technological community, farmers – have been the primary means
of societal engagement in UN Conferences on Sustainable Develop-
ment.
9. Statements in OWG Sessions 7 and 10.
10. Statements in OWG Sessions 7, 10 and 11.
11. Statement in OWG Session 11.
12. Statements in OWG Sessions 7 and 10.
13. Statement in OWG Session 7.
14. Statement in OWG Session 10.
15. Statements in OWG Sessions 7 and 10.
16. Divergences between the stances of individual countries/troikas and
of their broader country-groupings reﬂect also the unconventional
format of the OWG which provided greater scope for countries to
place their own positions for discussion. However, on highly con-
tentious issues like Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
(CBDR), there was considerable consensus within both the develop-
ing and developed country groupings, largely mirroring stances
adopted in other UN negotiations on the environment.
17. Donoghue observed many of the interactions, in the OWG as Ire-
land’s UN Ambassador and as co-chair of the Intergovernmental
Negotiations on the 2030 Agenda that followed submission of the
OWG’s report.
18. Statement in OWG Session 7.
19. Statement in OWG Session 7.
20. See, in particular, statements by the G77-and-China (in OWG Ses-
sions 9, 10 and 11), Brazil and Nicaragua (in Sessions 10 and 11),
India (in Sessions 9 and 10) and Argentina-Bolivia-Ecuador (in Ses-
sion 11).
21. Statement by the G77-and-China in OWG Session 11.
22. Statement by India-Pakistan-Sri Lanka in OWG Session 7.
23. Statement by Brazil-Nicaragua in OWG Session 11.
24. Statements by Iran, China-Indonesia-Kazakhstan, and the G77-and-
China (all in OWG Session 11).
25. Statements by Australia-Netherlands-UK, Poland-Romania, Japan,
and Portugal (all in OWG Session 9).
26. Statements by Poland-Romania (in OWG Sessions 9 and 11), Slove-
nia-Montenegro (in Session 10); Greece (in Session 10); Finland (in
Sessions 9 and 10); the European Union (in Session 7); and Sweden
(in Session 9).
27. Statements made by China-Indonesia-Kazakhstan (in OWG Session
11); India (in Session 11); Brazil-Nicaragua (in Sessions 10 and 11);
and Argentina-Bolivia-Ecuador (in Session 11).
28. For example, according to Dodds et al. (2017) the US government
eventually accepted reference to CBDR in return for revised text on
biodiversity.
29. For a summary of these linkages, see http://www.unep.org/10yfp/ab
out/10yfp-and-sdgs.
30. Statements by Argentina-Bolivia-Ecuador; China-Indonesia-Kazakh-
stan; and India (all in OWG Session 11).
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31. For a detailed overview of the IAEG-SDGs indicator selection pro-
cess, see UN (2016a, pp. 4–6).
32. For example, in regard to the proxy adopted for all waste-recycling,
only a quarter of municipal waste is recycled (Statistics Netherlands,
2017). For the SDGs as a whole, only a third of the indicators are
currently included in Netherlands statistics.
33. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Colombia, Denmark, Japan, US,
Brazil, France, Germany, India, China and Cuba. Similar reservations
were expressed during the Open Consultation on Green Indicators
facilitated by the IAEG-SDGs. [Statements by IAEG-SDGs member
countries were made on behalf of their respective sub-regional
groupings. For brevity in the notes, we mention only the country
making the statement.]
34. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by UNEP and WRI.
35. Statement to the IAEG-SDGs by Denmark and statement during the
Open Consultation on Green Indicators by the UN Special Rappor-
teur on Hazardous Substances.
36. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Colombia, France, Canada, Ecuador,
Switzerland, Eurostat, Cuba, India and Germany.
37. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Germany, Denmark, Colombia,
Canada, UN Statistical System. Organizations, Eurostat, Mexico, India,
France and Kyrgyzstan. Similar statements were made during the
Open Consultation on Green Indicators by various CSOs.
38. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Japan, Brazil, UK, Estonia, Australia,
Germany, France, IMF, Cuba, China and Paraguay.
39. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Colombia and Cuba (on indicator
12.1.1), and by Denmark, Brazil, Germany and Cuba (on indicator
12.7.1).
40. For the proposal, see statement to the IAEG-SDGs by Denmark,
Estonia and Brazil.
41. Statement to the IAEG-SDGs by the UNSSO. For the proposal, see
statement to the IAEG-SDGs by Colombia and Cuba.
42. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Denmark. Statements in Open
Consultation on Green Indicators by UNEP and CSOs.
43. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Ecuador, Australia, Germany and
Cuba. Statements in Open Consultation on Green Indicators by
UNEP and CSOs.
44. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Colombia, Brazil, Denmark and
Germany. Statements in Open Consultation on Green Indicators by
GRI and other CSOs.
45. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Japan, Brazil, Canada, Turkey, Esto-
nia, China, Cuba, Argentina, Paraguay, Fiji and Samoa.
46. In particular, the Aichi targets agreed under the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). See the statements to the IAEG-SDGs by
UK, Denmark, India, the Netherlands and Kyrgyzstan.
47. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by France, Switzerland and Eurostat.
48. Statement to the IAEG-SDGs by Germany. Statements in Open Con-
sultation on Grey Indicators by UNEP and Hungary.
49. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Canada, Estonia, Germany, Aus-
tralia, Colombia, Singapore and Cuba.
50. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Denmark, UNECE, and Canada.
51. Inﬂuenced by a statement to the IAEG-SDGs by Brazil, and state-
ments in Open Consultation on Grey Indicators by UNEP, UNESCO
and CSOs.
52. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by France, Mexico, Brazil, United
States, China, Paraguay and Uruguay (for indicator 12.a.1), and by
Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Germany, Japan, United States, Tur-
key, India, Cuba and China (for indicator 12.b.1).
53. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Canada, India, Ecuador,
Colombia, Japan, Estonia, Australia, Cuba, China, Germany and
Sweden.
54. Statements to the IAEG-SDGs by Canada, China, Sweden, UNSSO,
Germany and Cuba (for indicator 12.a.1), and by UNSSO, Mexico
and Australia (for indicator 12.b.1).
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